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Abstract
We consider bargaining problems with at least one cardinal player and with ordinal players, and
provide a complete description of utility invariant solutions of such problems for two players. For
the n-person case we provide a procedure that: (i) returns a given cardinal solution if there are only
cardinal players; (ii) is based on the ordinal solution for gradual bargaining problems, introduced
by O’Neill et al. [O’Neill, B., Samet, D., Wiener, Z., Winter, E., 2002. Bargaining with an agenda.
Games Econ. Behav., in press], for the ordinal players. Finally, we introduce the so-called cardinal
concession solution as another example of a utility invariant solution.
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1. Introduction
We consider n-person pure bargaining problems, that is, situations where the only pos-
sible outcomes involve either complete cooperation of all players or complete breakdown
of cooperation.
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Most of the game theoretic literature on bargaining assumes that players are cardinal.
Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that they have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over out-
comes: their preferences are represented by expected utility functions, which are unique
up to positive afﬁne transformations. Therefore, it is natural to impose the requirement
that bargaining solutions be invariant under such transformations. The most prominent so-
lutions in the literature (Nash, 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975; Perles and Maschler,
1981) satisfy this property of cardinal invariance.
In contrast, traditional economic theory considers bargaining problems in which the
players are ordinal, for instance the exchange of commodities between consumers. In that
case, a bargaining solution should be invariant under all monotonically increasing transfor-
mations of the players’ utility functions. This property is called ordinal invariance.
A remarkable consequence of the fact that bargaining theory abstracts from the physical
environment and considers only the image in utility space, is the impossibility, observed
by Shapley (1969), of ordinally invariant two-person bargaining solutions that are nondic-
tatorial and do not assign the disagreement point. This impossibility result, however, is no
longer true if there are more than two bargainers. Shubik (1982, pp. 90–98) describes a
three-person ordinally invariant solution, attributed to Shapley. Sprumont (2000) uses the
associated construction to characterize ordinally equivalent bargaining problems by deriv-
ing a complete set of representative problems. Basically, this characterization solves the
question of describing all ordinally invariant bargaining solutions. Kibris (2001) gives an
axiomatic characterization of the solution in Shubik (1982), based on the construction in
Sprumont’s paper. See also Safra and Samet (2001, 2004) for extensions.
The assumption that bargaining theory should only use the information available in
the feasible set of utility tuples is sometimes called welfarism. Dropping this assumption
makes it much easier to ﬁnd natural ordinally invariant solutions, as recently demonstrated
in Nicolò and Perea (2000), but at the same time makes the theory less general. Also in
the present paper we relax the welfarist assumption: we assume that at least one player
is cardinal and the other players are ordinal. (Obviously, if the names of the ordinal and
cardinal players are ﬁxed and known, we are back in the welfarist framework.) We show
by an example of a bargaining problem between a manager who is paid in risky stocks and
a worker who is paid in riskless money, that such a situation can make a lot of sense.
A bargaining solution will be called utility invariant if it is ordinally invariant for the
ordinal players and cardinally invariant for the cardinal players. We give a complete de-
scription of utility invariant solutions for bargaining problems with one cardinal and one
ordinal player, also involving additional conditions like individual rationality or Pareto op-
timality. This is easy since all such problems are equivalent under cardinal-ordinal utility
transformations.
There are many ways to extend these two-person solutions to n-person problems with
at least one cardinal player. Here, we describe one such procedure. This procedure returns
a given cardinal solution (e.g., Nash, Kalai–Smorodinsky, etc.) if there are only cardinal
players. If there are also ordinal players, we proceed, roughly, as follows. The cardinal
players receive a ﬁxed percentage of the gains associated with the cardinal solution pay-
offs they would receive if the ordinal players would receive their disagreement payoffs.
The line segment connecting the disagreement payoffs for the cardinal players and their
cardinal solution payoffs determines a gradual bargaining problem for the ordinal players22 E. Calvo, H. Peters / Games and Economic Behavior 52 (2005) 20–33
in the sense of O’Neill et al. (2002). Then, we apply the ordinal solution proposed by these
authors to determine the payoffs for the ordinal players.
Finally, we present an example of a solution, the so-called cardinal concession solution,
that arises in a somewhat different way. It is deﬁned by considering integral curves of a
speciﬁc vector ﬁeld, coincides with the Perles–Maschler solution (for two players) and an
extension thereof (for n players) if there are only cardinal players, and with the solution
produced by the above procedure if there is exactly one cardinal player. In the other mixed
cases, however, it treats cardinal players in a more sophisticated way. We include this
example to illustrate that there are many ways, apart from the procedure above, to obtain
reasonable utility invariant solutions.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present a two-person
manager-worker problem as an example of a situation with a cardinal and an ordinal player.
AfterthepreliminariesinSection3,wetreatthetwo-personcaseinSection4andtheexten-
sion to the n-person case in Section 5. Section 6 is concerned with the cardinal concession
solution, and Section 7 concludes.
2. A two-person example
Suppose that the owner of a ﬁrm wants to distribute a reward between a worker (pla-
yer 1) and a manager (player 2). The total amount to distribute is one monetary unit. The
payoffs for the worker are in money (m units), and for the manager in stocks of the ﬁrm
(s units). Denoting the stock price by p, we thus have m+ps  1.
We assume that the worker’s preferences are ordinal, represented by a continuous and
strictly increasing utility function u1 for money. We also assume that the manager must
wait until the next period to sell the stocks, and that there is uncertainty about the future
price: it will be either p1 or p2, each with probability one half, and the manager has ex-
pected utility of the form Eu2(s) = 1
2u2(p1s)+ 1
2u2(p2s), where u2 is again a continuous
strictly increasing function. The disagreement outcome corresponds to the worker and the
manager both receiving zero, and the disagreement vector is d = (u1(0),u2(0)). The bar-
gaining problem is summarized by the pair (S,d), where S is the feasible utility set
S =
 
x ∈ R2: x1 = u1(m), x2 = Eu2(s), m+ps  1
 
.
A bargaining solution is a function ψ that assigns to a bargaining problem (S,d) a feasible
point ψ(S,d)∈ S. In our example a reasonable solution should satisfy ψ(S,d) d (indi-
vidual rationality) and ψ(S,d)∈ ∂S (Pareto optimality), where ∂S denotes the boundary
of S.L e tI(S,d)be the ‘ideal point,’ as indicated in Fig. 1. (All concepts will be introduced
more formally in the next section.) For every real number r ∈[ 0,1], deﬁne the solution ϕr
such that ϕr(S,d) ∈ ∂S and ϕr
2(S,d) = rI2(S,d) + (1 − r)d2 (see Fig. 1). It is straight-
forward to check that this solution is utility invariant: more precisely, if u1 is transformed
by a strictly increasing continuous function (player 1 is ordinal) and u2 by a positive afﬁne
transformation (player 2 is cardinal) then to obtain the solution of the transformed bar-
gaining problem we can just apply the two transformations to the point ϕr(S,d). In other
words, the underlying agreement in terms of money for the worker and stocks for the man-
ager has not changed.E. Calvo, H. Peters / Games and Economic Behavior 52 (2005) 20–33 23
Fig. 1. A two-person example.
In Section 4 we show that any individually rational, Pareto optimal, and utility invariant
solution must be equal to ϕr for some r ∈[ 0,1]. Hence, where there is an abundance of
solutions if the two players are cardinal, and only two dictatorial solutions (namely, ϕ0 and
ϕ1) if the two players are ordinal (cf. Shapley, 1969), there is basically a one-dimensional
family of solutions in the mixed case.
3. Preliminaries
Let N ={ 1,...,n} (with n  2) be the set of players, and let ∅  = C ⊆ N. Members of
C are called cardinal and members of N\C are called ordinal.Abargaining problem (for
N) is a pair (S,d) where:
(i) the feasible set S ⊆ RN is closed and comprehensive, i.e., if x ∈ S and y ∈ RN with
x  y then y ∈ S;1
(ii) S is unbounded in every coordinate;
(iii) the set {x ∈ S: x  y} is bounded for every y ∈ S;
(iv) the boundary ∂S of S is non-level, that is, if x ∈ ∂S and y ∈ RN with y  x and y  = x,
then y/ ∈ S;
(v) the disagreement point d is an element of int(S) (the interior of S).
The interpretation is that the players either agree on some point x in S, yielding utility xi
to player i, or disagree, in which case each player i ends up with utility di.
Observethatthereisnoconvexityconditiononthe feasibleset:convexitydoesnotmake
sense if one or more of the players are ordinal, since it is not preserved under arbitrary
monotonic transformations.2
We denote by BN the family of bargaining problems (S,d) for N.
1 x  y means xi  yi and x<ymeans xi <y i for every i. Analogously for  and >.
2 In Sections 5 and 6 we impose a few additional conditions on bargaining problems.24 E. Calvo, H. Peters / Games and Economic Behavior 52 (2005) 20–33
For (S,d) ∈ BN and every i ∈ N we deﬁne
Ii(S,d) := max
 
yi: y ∈ S and yj = dj for all j ∈ N\{i}
 
.
The point I(S,d):= (Ii(S,d))i∈N is called the ideal point of (S,d).
A bargaining solution ψ is a map ψ :BN → RN such that for every (S,d) ∈ BN,
ψ(S,d)∈ S.
An order-preserving transformation is a strictly increasing function on R. Such a func-
tion is necessarily continuous, and its inverse is again an order-preserving transforma-
tion. Let f ={ fi: i ∈ N} be a set of order-preserving transformations. For x ∈ RN and
(S,d) ∈ BN denote f(x)= (f1(x1),...,fn(xn)), and f(S)={ f(x): x ∈ S}. Observe that
(f(S),f(d)) ∈ BN.
A subclass of order-preserving transformations is the class of the positive afﬁne trans-
formations of the form τ  → b +aτ for all τ ∈ R, where a,b∈ R, a>0.
We say that a bargaining solution ψ is utility invariant if for every set f of
order-preserving transformations such that fi is positive afﬁne for all i ∈ C,w eh a v e
ψ(f(S),f(d)) = f(ψ(S,d))for all (S,d) ∈ B.
A bargaining solution ψ is Pareto optimal if ψ(S,d)∈ ∂S for every (S,d) ∈ BN, and
individually rational if ψ(S,d) d for every (S,d) ∈ BN.
4. One cardinal and one ordinal player
Let N ={ 1,2} and C ={ 2}, so player 1 is ordinal and player 2 is cardinal. We start with
the following observation.
Lemma 4.1. Let (S,d),(T,e) ∈ BN. Then there is a pair of order-preserving transforma-
tions f = (f1,f2), with f2 positive afﬁne, such that (T,e) = (f(S),f(d)).
Proof. Let g2 be a positive afﬁne transformation such that e2 = g2(d2) and I2(T,e) =
g2(I2(S,d)). Next, for every τ ∈ R let h(τ) ∈ R be deﬁned by (τ,h(τ)) ∈ ∂S. Then
h:R → R isastrictlydecreasingfunction.Also,forevery τ ∈ R deﬁne j(τ)by (j(τ),τ) ∈
∂T.A g a i n ,j :R → R is a strictly decreasing function. Now the desired transformations
are f1 := j ◦g2 ◦h and f2 := g2. 
Fix an arbitrary bargaining problem (¯ S, ¯ d)∈ BN, and let x ∈ ¯ S be an arbitrary point. By
Lemma 4.1, there is a unique utility invariant bargaining solution that assigns x to (¯ S, ¯ d).
Denote this solution by ψx, then we have just derived:
Corollary 4.2. A bargaining solution ψ :BN → RN is utility invariant if and only if there
is an x ∈ ¯ S with ψ = ψx.
Obviously, the family of all utility invariant Pareto optimal [individually rational] bar-
gaining solutions is obtained by restricting x to ∂ ¯ S [to {x ∈ ¯ S: x  d}]. A nicer way
to describe the intersection of these families is as follows. For every r ∈[ 0,1] let ϕr
be the bargaining solution with for every (S,d) ∈ BN: ϕr(S,d) ∈ ∂S and ϕr
2(S,d) =
rI2(S,d)+(1−r)d2.E. Calvo, H. Peters / Games and Economic Behavior 52 (2005) 20–33 25
Corollary 4.3. A solution ψ on BN is utility invariant, Pareto optimal, and individually
rational if, and only if, ψ = ϕr for some r ∈[ 0,1].
Proof. Obviously, every ϕr satisﬁes the three conditions in the corollary. For a solution
ψ satisfying these conditions, by Pareto optimality and individual rationality there is an
r ∈[ 0,1] such that ψ(¯ S, ¯ d)= ϕr(¯ S, ¯ d). By utility invariance and Lemma 4.1, ψ = ϕr. 
Corollary 4.3 provides a simple but complete description of all utility invariant, Pareto
optimal, and individually rational bargaining solutions. If N = C, then of course any of the
well-knowntwo-person bargainingsolutions(Nash,Kalai–Smorodinsky,Perles–Maschler,
etc.) satisﬁes these conditions. In the next section we provide an extension to more than
two players.
5. More than two players
In this section we extend the family of bargaining solutions described in Corollary 4.3
to more than two players. There are many ways to do this but here we concentrate on a
solution (or rather, class of solutions) that satisﬁes the following requirements:
(i) if there are only cardinal players, then the solution should coincide with a given ‘car-
dinal’ solution;
(ii) the cardinal players receive a ﬁxed fraction of the gain associated with the cardinal
solution outcome that would result if the ordinal players would be kept down to their
disagreement payoffs;
(iii) subject to the constraint imposed by (ii), the ordinal players receive payoffs according
to the ordinal solution of O’Neill et al. (2002).
Implicit in this procedure is that the obtained solution should be utility invariant, individu-
ally rational, and Pareto optimal.
Concerning the ﬁrst requirement, let C be any set of cardinal players, let DC ⊆ BC, and
let ϕ:DC → RC be a utility invariant, individually rational, Pareto optimal, and symmetric
solution. (Symmetry means that the players should receive equal payoffs in a symmetric
bargaining problem, i.e., a bargaining problem that is invariant under any permutation of
the coordinates.) For brevity, we call such a solution classical. For example, DC could be
thesetofallbargainingproblemswith(cardinal)playersetC andwithconvexfeasiblesets,
and ϕ could be the |C|-person3 Nash bargaining solution, assigning to each (S,d) ∈ DC
the unique maximizer of the product
 
i∈C(xi −di) over the set {x ∈ S: x  d}.4
In order to proceed with requirements (ii) and (iii), we need to be explicit about the or-
dinal solution of O’Neill et al. (2002). Let O be a (ﬁnite) set of (ordinal) players (possibly,
|O|=1). An agenda is a function α:RO → R that is continuously differentiable, with
3 For a ﬁnite set X, |X| denotes its cardinality.
4 If |C|=1, then a bargaining problem is deﬁned as a pair ((−∞,a],d),w h e r ea,d ∈ R with a>d.26 E. Calvo, H. Peters / Games and Economic Behavior 52 (2005) 20–33
(strictly) positive gradient that satisﬁes a local Lipschitz continuity condition. (See O’Neill
et al., 2002 for a discussion of these and other assumptions, and for more details about
the ordinal solution.) If α is an agenda and d ∈ RO, then the pair (α,d) is called a grad-
ual bargaining problem. Note that in a gradual bargaining problem there is a sequence of
increasing feasible sets ({x ∈ RO: α(x) t})t∈R.T h eordinal solution Ω associates with
each gradual bargaining problem (α,d) a (continuously differentiable) function (‘path’)








  −1,i ∈ O, (1)
(where α 






Foreverygradualbargainingproblemthispathisunique.Denotethispathby ω = Ω(α,d).
Then, α(ω(t)) = t for every t ∈ R (Pareto optimality), ω(t)  d for every t ∈ R with
t  α(d)(individualrationality),and Ω isordinallyinvariant:if f = (fi)i∈O isacollection
of order-preserving transformations,5 then for every gradual bargaining problem (α,d),
we have Ω(α,d)= f(Ω(β,e)), where d = f(e)and β = α ◦ f. In spite of its technical
deﬁnition the ordinal solution has a simple interpretation: the ratio of player i’s and j’s
marginal increments of utility at ‘time’ t, ω 
i(t)/ω 
j(t), is equal to the marginal rate of
substitution of i’s and j’s utilities along the boundary {x ∈ RO: α(x)= t} of the feasible
s e ta tt i m et.
Before we continue we need some notation. For a vector y ∈ RN and a proper subset
M ⊆ N,l e tyM denote the restriction of y to the coordinates in M.F o rS ⊆ RN and
¯ x ∈ RN\M,l e t
SM,¯ x =
 
y ∈ RM: there is an x ∈ S with y = xM and xN\M =¯ x
 
,
the ‘slice’ of S for coalition M where the complement N\M receives ¯ x.
Let now N be a player set, with ∅  = C ⊆ N the subset of cardinal players, and O =
N\C the subset of ordinal players. Let ϕ:DC → RC be a classical solution for some DC ⊆
BC. We will deﬁne a utility invariant, individually rational, and Pareto optimal solution
ψϕ,Ω onasubset B N of BN.Wedeﬁnethissubsetofbargainingproblemsalongtheway.If
N = C, then ψϕ,Ω := ϕ; hence, for this case we deﬁne B N = DN. Otherwise, let (S,d) be
a bargaining problem for N and assume that (SC,dO,dC) ∈ DC (hence, this is a restriction
on BN), so that ϕ(SC,dO,dC) is well-deﬁned. Let zC := ϕ(SC,dO,dC). Hence, zC is the
outcome for the cardinal players if the ordinal players would receive their disagreement
payoffs. For every t ∈ R, deﬁne the point xC(t) ∈ RC by xC(t) := (1−t)zC +tdC. Under
appropriate conditions on BN (to guarantee smoothness and local Lipschitz continuity—so
this is another restriction on BN) the points xC(t) generate a gradual bargaining problem
with feasible sets SO,xC(t) (t ∈ R) and disagreement point dO. Let the ordinal solution for






5 Here, only those oder-preserving transformations are allowed that map gradual bargaining problems into
gradual bargaining problems.E. Calvo, H. Peters / Games and Economic Behavior 52 (2005) 20–33 27
Hence, the cardinal players receive the fraction |C|/|N| of the gain zC − dC, which they
would obtain if the ordinal players were kept down to their disagreement utilities dO.
The number t∗ plays a similar role as the number r in Corollary 4.3. The choice for t∗
proposed here guarantees that the solution is symmetric at least on the bargaining problem
({x ∈ RN:
 
i∈N xi  1},0). Given that the cardinal players receive xC(t∗), the ordinal
players play the induced gradual bargaining problem and receive utilities according to the
ordinal solution Ω.
The solution ψϕ,Ω proposed here is utility invariant (obvious for the cardinal players,
and for the ordinal players this follows from ordinal invariance of the ordinal solution6),
Pareto optimal, and individually rational. It can be varied by choosing different classical
solutions ϕ, or other solutions instead of Ω for the gradual bargaining problem.
If there is exactly one cardinal player, say player n, then according to ψϕ,Ω this player
receives (1/n)(In(S,d)−dn) (this is independent of the classical solution ϕ since for only
one player all these solutions coincide). The gradual bargaining problem for O = N\{n}
then consists of all slices of S with ﬁxed utility for player n. (See Fig. 2 in Section 6 for an
illustration.) Thus, in this gradual bargaining problem the feasible sets are endogenously
determined by the utility levels of the cardinal player. In this sense, adding one cardinal
player results in an ‘endogenization’ of the feasible sets in a gradual bargaining problem.
6. The cardinal concession solution
The cardinal concession (cc) solution is constructed in a different way than the solu-
tion(s) in the previous section. If there are only cardinal players, then the solution coincides
with the Perles–Maschler solution (for two players) or an extension thereof (for more than
two players). If there is exactly one cardinal player, then the solution coincides again with
ψϕ,Ω (for any classical solution ϕ). In the remaining mixed cases, however, the cardinal
players are treated in a more sophisticated way. Thus, this shows that the procedure for
ﬁnding utility invariant solutions, discussed in the preceding section, certainly does not
exhaust the possibilities.
The cc-solution will be deﬁned on the class BN
s of bargaining problems, characterized
as follows. A bargaining problem (S,d) ∈ BN is in BN
s if and only if there is a func-
tion g:RN → R with continuously differentiable and positive partial derivatives, such that
∂S={ x ∈ RN: g(x)= 0}.T h eith partial derivative of g is denoted by g 
i.
Let (S,d) ∈ BN
s . For a point x ∈ S and j ∈ N,l e txj := (xN\{j},Ij(S,x)). (In this
notation we suppress dependence of the point xj on the set S.) Hence, xj is the best point
for j if the other players i are kept to xi. We deﬁne the vector ﬁeld v on the interior of S,
int(S), as follows:
vS(x)i :=
   
j∈C







, for all i ∈ N, x∈ int(S). (2)
6 It is assumed that only those order-preserving transformations are considered such that the resulting bargain-
ing problems are again in the class B N.28 E. Calvo, H. Peters / Games and Economic Behavior 52 (2005) 20–33
The vector ﬁeld v can be interpreted as assigning to an interior point x a kind of geometric
mean of the exchange rates of utilities at associated points xj on the boundary of S.
We proceed by showing that through each point of the interior of S there is a unique
integral curve of v. First, we construct a new vector ﬁeld ¯ v on all of RN, as follows.
Extend the deﬁnition of the ‘ideal point’ I(S,x) to all of RN (we can take exactly the
same deﬁnition as in Section 3, noting that the feasible set S is assumed unbounded in
every coordinate), and deﬁne the distance function DS(x) :=
 
i∈N[Ii(S,x) − xi] for all






DS(x)vS(x) if x ∈ int(S),
0i f x ∈ ∂S,
DS(x)vS(I(S,x)) if x/ ∈ S.
Lemma 6.1. Let (S,d) ∈ BN
s ,l e tx0 ∈ RN, and let T be a real interval with 0 ∈ int(T).
Then there is a unique differentiable function ξ(·,x0):T → RN with ξ(0,x0) = x0 and
with (d/dt)ξ(t,x0) =¯ vS(ξ(t,x0)) for all t ∈ T .
Proof. This lemma follows from standard results in the theory of ordinary differential
equations. See, for example, Chapter 8 of Hirsch and Smale (1974). It is sufﬁcient that the
map x  →¯ vS(x) is locally Lipschitz continuous on RN.I fg is the function associated with
S, then by assumption, the partial derivatives g 
i(xj) never vanish and have continuous
partial derivatives. Therefore, ¯ vS(x) has continuous ﬁrst-order partial derivatives, and this
implies Lipschitz continuity. 
It is now straightforward to deﬁne the cardinal concession solution κ :BN
s → RN.L e t
(S,d) ∈ BN
s and let ξ(·,d) be the unique integral curve of the vector ﬁeld ¯ vS passing
through d. Note that (the graph of) this curve is strictly increasing, since the partial deriv-
atives of the function g describing ∂S are positive. This curve must cross the boundary ∂S
at some point ξ(t∗,d): if not, then it would converge to a point z ∈ int(S), but then it can
be uniquely extended by the integral curve of ¯ v passing through z, a contradiction. Note
that ξ(·,d) is also an (hence, the) integral curve of the vector ﬁeld vS on the interior of
S, since on int(S) these vector ﬁelds do not differ in direction. Deﬁne κ(S,d):= ξ(t∗,d).
The solution κ deﬁned this way is obviously Pareto optimal and individually rational. Fur-
ther, κ(S,e)= κ(S,d) whenever e is a point on the integral curve ξ(·,d). Another direct
consequence of Lemma 6.1 is that different curves never intersect and, in particular, never
cross ∂S at the same point.
We show now that κ is utility invariant with respect to those order-preserving trans-
formations that map bargaining problems in BN
s to problems in the same set. Therefore,
we restrict attention to transformations f ={ fi: i ∈ N} such that each fi is twice contin-
uously differentiable, with positive ﬁrst derivative everywhere. Of course, positive afﬁne
transformations have these properties. In the remainder of this section utility invariance is
understood to be invariance with respect to transformations of this kind.
Thefollowinglemmagivesthesimplerelationbetweenthepartialderivativesassociated
with a bargaining problem and the transformed problem.E. Calvo, H. Peters / Games and Economic Behavior 52 (2005) 20–33 29
Lemma6.2.Let (S,d) ∈ BN
s andlet f beacollectionoforder-preservingtransformations.








Proof. Note that we can write h = g ◦ f −1 (where f −1 ={ f −1
i : i ∈ N}), hence for
i ∈ N and x ∈ ∂S,w eh a v eh 
i(f(x)) = (g ◦ f −1) 
i(f(x)) = g 
i(x) · (f −1




Theorem 6.3. κ is utility invariant.
Proof. In order to show that κ is utility invariant, we have to show that the integral curves
of the vector ﬁeld vS are utility invariant. Let (S,d) ∈ BN
s ,l e tf ={ fi: i ∈ N} be a set of
order preserving transformations, and let ξ(·,d)and ξf(·,f(d)) be the integral curves of



















for all i ∈ N, (3)
where µ:int(f(S)) → R is some positive and continuously differentiable function (this
function may change the speed through the integral curve, but does not change its direc-

























Denoting for any two vectors x,y ∈ RN, x ∗ y = (x1y1,...,xnyn), and f  (x) =
(f  
1(x1),...,f 
n(xn)), (3) can be rewritten as































where the ﬁrst equality follows from (4). Hence, we are left to show that (5) holds.
First note that the fi are positive afﬁne for all i ∈ C,s a yfi(xi) = bi + aixi.R e -
call that d
j
i = di if i  = j, and di
i = Ii(S,d), for all i. Hence, f  
i(d
j
i ) = f  
i(di) for all
i  = j. Moreover, if i ∈ C, f  
i(Ii(S,d)) = ai = f  
i(di). By this and Lemma 6.2 we have
h 
i(f(dj)) = g 
i(dj)/f  
i(di) (where, as in Lemma 6.2, g describes ∂S and h describes






   
j∈C








   
j∈C
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Fig. 2. The upper diagram illustrates the proof of Corollary 6.4. The lower diagram illustrates the case n = 2 with
one cardinal player: the graph of ξ is obtained by rotating the part of ∂S above κ(S,d),s oκ(S,d)= ϕr(S,d)
with r = 1/2.
So [
 
k∈C ak]1/|C| ·vf(S)[f(d)]=f  (d)∗vS(d), and (5) holds. 
For the case of exactly one cardinal player the solution κ coincides with the solution
ψϕ,Ω for any classical solution ϕ. See Fig. 2.
Corollary 6.4. Let |C|=1 and let ϕ be a classical solution. Then κ(S,d)= ψϕ,Ω(S,d)
for every (S,d) ∈ BN
s .
Proof. For (S,d) ∈ BN
s ,l e tξ(·,d) be the integral curve of vS through d. Then κ(S,d)
is the point of intersection of the curve with ∂S. We may assume d = ξ(0,d) and
κ(S,d) = ξ(1,d). Let 1 be the cardinal player and let O = N\{1}.F o r0 t  1, the
slices SO,ξ1(t,d) form (part of) a gradual bargaining problem, and projected on these sets
the curve {ξ(t,d):0 t  1} determines a curve {ξ−1(t,d): (ξ2(t,d),...,ξn(t,d)):0
t  1}, where for each t ∈[ 0,1], the point ξ−1(t,d) is on the boundary of the feasible setE. Calvo, H. Peters / Games and Economic Behavior 52 (2005) 20–33 31





















for all i,j ∈ N.
But by (1), this implies that the curve {ξ−1(t,d):0  t  1} is exactly the curve that
determines the ordinal solution of the gradual bargaining problem for O.
We are left to show that κ1(S,d) = d1 + 1
n[I1(S,d) − d1]. Consider the paths ξ and P
as in Fig. 2. We ﬁrst construct a set of order preserving transformations f such that the
transformed path ξf is a straight line.
Let f1 be a positive afﬁne transformation such that f1(d1) = 0 and f1(I1(S,d)) = 1.
For all i  = 1, deﬁne fi such that fi (ξi(t,d)) = f1(ξ1(t,d)). Because ξ is a differentiable
function, the corresponding fi are twice continuously differentiable, with positive ﬁrst
derivatives everywhere. Deﬁned in this way, and because κ is utility invariant, the integral




















for all i,j ∈ N.
Now we show that the corresponding Pf is also a straight line. Denote by h the function
that describes ∂f (S). To simplify notation, denote by pf(t) the corresponding point in Pf
such that p
f
i (t) = ξ
f














for all i ∈ N. Then (6) and (7) imply h 
i(p(t)) = h 
j(p(t)) for all i,j ∈ N. The fact that the
normal vector to ∂f (S) in every pf(t) has all its components equal and positive implies
that Pf is a straight line through (1,0,...,0) and f1(κ1(S,d))·(1,...,1). Moreover, Pf
is included in the hyperplane H ={ x ∈ RN:
 
i∈N xi = 1}, which ﬁnally implies that
f1(κ1(S,d)) = 1
n, and thus κ1(S,d) = d1 + 1
n[I1(S,d)−d1]. 
The lower diagram in Fig. 2 illustrates the two-player case with one cardinal player. In
this case, the graph of the curve ξ is obtained by rotating the upper part of ∂S along the
horizontal line through ϕ1/2(S,d) (cf. Section 4), as can be inferred directly from (2).
We conclude this section with three further remarks on the cc-solution.
Remark 6.5 (Two players, cardinal). If there are only two players, both cardinal, then
the cc-solution κ coincides with the Perles–Maschler (1981) solution. This can be seen as
follows. Denoting by ζ the Perles–Maschler solution, the differential equation for ζ using















, for all x ∈ int(S), (8)32 E. Calvo, H. Peters / Games and Economic Behavior 52 (2005) 20–33
where, as before, g is the function describing ∂S. (See the deﬁnition of the solution by
Procedure 2 in Perles and Maschler, 1981, or Section 2 in Calvo and Gutiérrez, 1994.)


















































Hence, both vector ﬁelds, vS and ζS, are collineal and therefore produce the same integral
curves, so κ and ζ coincide.
Remark 6.6 (More than two players, cardinal). In Perles and Maschler (1981) the super-
additive solution was supported by a set of axioms: efﬁciency, symmetry, continuity, car-
dinal invariance and superadditivity. In Perles (1982) it is proved that for three-person
problems a solution that satisﬁes efﬁciency, cardinal invariance, symmetry and superaddi-
tivity does not exist. In Calvo and Gutiérrez (1994) it was shown that (8) implies a property
that can be used to give a suitable extension of this solution to n-person problems. It can
be shown that this extension is a solution different from κ. Thus, κ restricted to cardinal
problems can be considered as an alternative extension of the super-additive solution.
Remark 6.7 (General case). In general, according to the solution κ, cardinal players no
longer receive a ﬁxed proportion of the gains they would obtain if the ordinal players were
kepttotheirdisagreementpayoffs,aswasthecaseforthesolutionsstudiedinthepreceding
sections. This can be seen by considering (2) for a bargaining problem with two cardinal
players and one ordinal player. The details are left to the reader.
7. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was twofold: to extend the bargaining problem by allow-
ing both cardinal and ordinal players, and two ﬁnd utility invariant solutions for it. The
procedure presented in Section 5 can be ‘axiomatized’ on a ‘meta-level’ by the following
choices: choose a classical solution for the cardinal players; choose the percentage of the
gains they would receive if the ordinal players were held down to their disagreement pay-
offs; and choose a solution for the gradual bargaining problem. The ordinal solution to the
gradual bargaining problem is characterized by O’Neill et al. (2002). The deﬁnition of the
cc-solution was inspired by the deﬁnition of a (purely) ordinal solution by Shapley (1995).E. Calvo, H. Peters / Games and Economic Behavior 52 (2005) 20–33 33
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